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Reverse Broken Windows
Christopher R. Green 
1. A Tale of Two Reports
On March 4, 2015, the Department of Justice released two reports related 
to Michael Brown’s death at the hands of Ferguson, Missouri, police offi  cer 
Darren Wilson on August 9, 2014. Brown’s death produced two waves of 
violent protests, one immediately after the shooting, lasting a few weeks, and 
another beginning on November 24, 2014, after a grand jury declined to indict 
Wilson.
One 86-page report 1 meticulously detailed all of the evidence about Brown’s 
shooting, concluding that evidence would not support a federal prosecution 
for unreasonable use of deadly force. A 105-page report, 2 however, revealed 
a great number of racial disparities in the practices of the Ferguson police 
department and municipal court, including (a) a focus on extracting revenue 
from, rather than supplying protection to, its citizenry; (b) widespread 
violation of the reasonable-suspicion requirement for stops and frisks; (c) 
arrests in retaliation for expressions of contempt for the police; (d) racially 
disparate and unnecessary use of dogs and Tasers to arrest African-American 
defendants; (e) a lower rate of drug possession among black citizens searched 
by police, despite a much higher rate of being searched if stopped.
This very brief essay will consider some of the implications of the Ferguson 
Report for how we understand the Brown Report, particularly the amazing 
number of witnesses initially claiming to have seen spectacular police 
misconduct. In short, it seems quite likely that police misbehavior over 
relatively low-level issues, like stop-and-frisk and arrest practice, led huge parts
1. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI 
POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON (2015) [hereinafter BROWN REPORT].
2. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT (2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT].
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of the black community to disbelieve police and grand jury assessments of 
the Brown-Wilson situation, encouraging the August and November waves 
of violence.
The “broken windows” theory of social order holds that maintaining order on 
high-level issues like murder, vandalism, and assault requires the maintenance 
of order on low-level issues like jaywalking, trespassing, public drunkenness, 
and the like.3 A corresponding theory, I suggest, applies to perceptions of 
police legitimacy: The maintenance of law enforcement offi  cials’ credibility 
with respect to the most serious accusations of misbehavior—i.e., whether a 
police offi  cer would summarily execute an unarmed black man like Michael 
Brown posing no threat to the offi  ce—depends on police credibility with respect 
to everyday practices like stop-and-frisk policy. Police offi  cers must, of course, 
defend themselves when attacked, and their work protecting crime victims is 
the fi rst duty of government. But police cannot perform their most critical 
protective tasks without the trust of the citizenry, and that trust depends on 
police performing even their most minor tasks fairly and equitably. That did 
not happen in Ferguson.
The bulk of this essay is inspired by the work of Bill Stuntz, who taught 
me criminal law in the fall of 1996. 4 If something like Ferguson had happened 
before Stuntz died in 2011, I would certainly have waited to hear what he had 
to say before off ering my own thoughts. I therefore take “What Would Bill 
Stuntz Say?” as my muse-guiding heuristic. 
The relationship between the Ferguson and Brown reports illustrates 
the reverse-broken-windows dynamic. That dynamic touches several topics 
studied in the law school curriculum—criminal law, criminal procedure, and 
constitutional law—without fi tting neatly into any of them, because they are 
areas not covered by the law.5 Analysis of the two Ferguson reports off ers 
several important ways in which law school curricula could be supplemented 
to address what the law doesn’t cover, as well as what it does.
First—as Stuntz began by teaching his criminal-law students twenty years 
ago—the criminal law that appears in appellate opinions focuses only on the 
outer boundaries of criminal liability, and only in cases where police have already 
investigated a suspect and a prosecutor has already decided to proceed with 
a case. Prosecutorial and police discretion within those boundaries, however, 
is largely lawless and opaque. Legislators pass enormously broad criminal 
statutes knowing that prosecutors need not enforce them to their full extent; 
3. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Activity, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 1982.
4. Stuntz was a professor at the University of Virginia and then Harvard for many years; he 
visited at Yale during the 1996-1997 school year. His posthumously published magnum opus 
was THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) [hereinafter CACJ].
5. Cf. Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in 1 THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES, 335 (Doubleday 
& Co. ed. 1930) (1894) (“‘I draw your attention,’ said Holmes, ‘to the curious incident of the 
dog in the night-time.’ ‘The dog did nothing in the night-time,’ replied Gregory. ‘That,’ said 
Holmes, ‘was the curious incident.’”).
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prosecutors and the police are far more important lawmakers in our system of 
criminal justice than the actual legislatures. Because such areas of discretionary 
decision-making lie outside a narrow conception of law, it is very easy to 
leave them outside law school curricula as well. At the same time, much data 
suggests that the fairness of these ungoverned, opaque, discretionary processes 
of executive discretion is a key ingredient to the ability of the criminal justice 
system to foster social order. 
Second, criminal procedure law considers in great detail the outer 
boundaries of when police may search, question, detain, or arrest suspects. Very 
little law, however, governs how police conduct these activities. In particular, 
the harshness of arrest procedures is governed only by a very general standard. 
Police behavior in Ferguson, and a long line of other very recent events—from 
the death of Eric Garner in New York following his “I can’t breathe” arrest to 
the death of Sandra Bland in Texas following her no-smoking-in-the-car “I 
will light you up” arrest—cry out for more fi ne-grained scrutiny than current 
law supplies. 
Third, the law of executive discretion most directly applicable in the 
Ferguson case—that is, state constitutional and state administrative law—
receives little or no systematic attention in constitutional law courses. It should 
not take a federal gove rnment investigation for local police and prosecutorial 
practices to receive legal scrutiny. State constitutional and administrative 
law off ers ample unexplored avenues for accountability, transparency, and 
improved legitimacy in the processes revealed in the Ferguson Report. State 
attorneys general, in particular, should take the initiative in probing the extent 
of their powers to require administrative regularity of local district attorneys 
and local law enforcement.
2. Criminal Law: Perceived Legitimacy as a
Critical Element of Criminal-Law Effectiveness
Tom Tyler’s 1990 study of Chicago 6 and its scholarly progeny 7—and an 
intellectual tradition going back to Max Weber and beyond—stress the 
importance of perceived fairness and legitimacy in causing people to obey 
the law. It is true that the law must use deterrence and raw force from time to 
time, but as a general matter a “beatings will continue until morale improves” 
approach is virtually never the right governing principle to restore order to 
urban environments.8 It was certainly not the right approach in Ferguson.
6. TOM R. TYLER, WHY DO PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
7. E.g., HUEN J. HUO & TOM R. TYLER, HOW DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS REACT TO LEGAL 
AUTHORITY (2000); Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361 (2001).
8. See TYLER, WHY DO PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW supra note 6, at 178 (“People obey the law because 
they believe it is proper to do so, they react to their experiences by evaluating their justice or 
injustice, and in evaluating the justice of their experiences they consider factors unrelated to 
outcome, such as whether they have had a chance to state their case and been treated with dignity 
and respect. . . . This image diff ers strikingly from that of the self-interest models which dominate 
current thinking in law, psychology, political science, sociology, and organizational theory . . .”).
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Stuntz’s  posthumous magnum opus9—not to mention countless other 
books and articles10—shows how many reasons the black communities 
have to distrust the criminal justice system. The Ferguson Report confi rms 
these complaints. The Ferguson Report notes that many African-American 
citizens in Ferguson are wrongly arrested for mere “contempt of cop.”11 First 
Amendment considerations in these arrests aside, the black community has a 
lot to be contemptuous about. As Stuntz remarks, it is amazing that the police 
are held in as high an esteem as they are by African-American citizens, given 
how poorly blacks are treated by the criminal justice system. “Given the sheer 
size of black incarceration over the past forty years, the absence of bad feeling 
toward the justice system would be more remarkable than its presence.”12
While Darren Wilson’s use of force was justifi ed according to the most 
credible witnesses and the forensic testimony, the black community refused 
to accept those witnesses, instead crediting rumors—thoroughly debunked 
in the Brown Report—that Brown was either running away, had his hands in 
the air, or was otherwise no threat to Wilson. In fact, the physical evidence 
confi rmed Wilson’s account: that Brown was attacking Wilson in Wilson’s 
car, attempting to get Wilson’s gun at the time Brown was fi rst shot, and that 
Brown was charging Wilson when Brown was later shot again several times 
and killed. Close to half of the report—from pages 44 to 78—debunk the details 
of 24 individual witnesses “whose accounts do not support a prosecution due 
to materially inconsistent prior statements or inconsistencies with the physical 
and forensic evidence.”13
The willingness of the citizens of Ferguson to give, and believe, accounts 
that portray their police in the worst possible light is quite striking indeed. 
The report explains over and over—and over and over—that witnesses gave 
demonstrably false, inconsistent, or otherwise unreliable accounts:
Witness 101’s account had “material parts . . . inconsistent with the physical 
and forensic evidence, internally inconsistent from one part of his account 
to the next, and inconsistent with other credible witness accounts that are 
corroborated by physical evidence.”14
Witness 123 was “inconsistent with the physical and forensic evidence.”15
9. STUNTZ, CACJ, supra note 4.
10. I cannot attempt any sort of canvass, but would be remiss not to mention MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN AN AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 
(2010); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997); and Angela J. Davis, Prosecution 
and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998).
11. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 25-26.
12. STUNTZ, CACJ, supra note 4, at 294. 
13. BROWN REPORT, supra note 1, at 44.
14. Id. at 47.
15. Id. at 48.
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Witness 133’s account was infl uenced by “watching the news [in which] 
‘hands up’ had become the ‘mantra’ of the protesters.”16
Witness 119 “admitted that he gave a false account.”17
Witness 125 “admitted that she gave false accounts.”18
Witness 131’s accounts were “inconsistent with each other, and his most 
recent version . . . inconsistent with the physical and forensic evidence.”19
Witness 112’s accounts were “inconsistent as to whether Brown held his 
hands up in surrender,” switching from yes to no.20
Witness 135’s account was “inconsistent with the forensic and physical 
evidence and inconsistent with other credible witness accounts” and 
she was “admittedly . . .  unsure of what she saw, both because she was 
distracted and because she has poor vision.”21
Witness 124 left investigators unable to “determine what she actually 
witnessed as opposed to what she may have heard from others.”22
Witness 127’s account was “contrary to the forensic and physical evidence 
and inconsistent with credible witness accounts.”23
Witness 118’s account was “riddled with internal inconsistencies, 
inconsistencies with the physical and forensic evidence, and inconsistencies 
with credible witness accounts,” and was from a witness whose “attention 
was admittedly diverted away from the shooting” and whose “account was 
also based on assumption and media coverage.”24
Witness 122’s accounts were “irreconcilable with the physical and forensic 
evidence” and also “inconsistent with each other and inconsistent with 
credible witness accounts.”25
Witness 130’s accounts were “inconsistent with each other, inconsistent 
with the physical and forensic evidence, and inconsistent with credible 
witness accounts.”26
16. Id. at 49.
17. Id. at 50.
18. Id. at 51.
19. Id. at 51.
20. Id. at 53.
21. Id. at 54.
22. Id. at 55.
23. Id. at 56.
24. Id. at 58.
25. Id. at 59.
26. Id. at 60.
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Witness 142 “changed his account and could off er no explanation as to 
why he did so,” and his “most recent account is inconsistent with credible 
witness accounts and inconsistent with forensic and physical evidence.”27
Witness 138’s accounts had “signifi cant inconsistencies between his two 
accounts, with the physical and forensic evidence, and with credible 
witness accounts.”28
Witness 132 gave an account “starkly inconsistent with what he initially 
told law enforcement . . . inconsistent with forensic and physical evidence, 
and . . . inconsistent with credible witness accounts.”29
Witness 121 “admittedly made false statements during her initial interview,” 
“demonstrated bias in favor of Brown’s family” and gave accounts 
“inconsistent with each other, inconsistent with the physical and forensic 
evidence, [and] inconsistent with credible accounts.”30
Witness 126 was “admittedly untruthful to the FBI, suff ers from memory 
loss, and provided internally inconsistent accounts that are also inconsistent 
with the physical and forensic evidence and credible witness accounts.”31
Witness 137 was “untruthful to the FBI during his initial interview, 
and untruthful in his media accounts” and “unable to off er a credible 
explanation as to why he was not truthful at the outset, leaving federal 
prosecutors to question what, if anything, he actually did witness” and 
also off ered accounts “inconsistent with each other, inconsistent with the 
physical and forensic evidence, and inconsistent with credible witness 
accounts.”32
Witness 128’s accounts were “inconsistent with each other, inconsistent 
with the forensic and physical evidence, and inconsistent with credible 
witness accounts.”33
Witness 140’s account had “large parts . . . admittedly fabricated from 
media accounts.”34
Witness 139’s account was “incoherent and inconsistent throughout, 
markedly inconsistent with the physical and forensic evidence, and 
inconsistent with credible witness accounts.”35
27. Id. at 62.
28. Id. at 63.
29. Id. at 64.
30. Id. at 66.
31. Id. at 67.
32. Id. at 68.
33. Id. at 70.
34. Id. at 72.
35. Id. at 74.
271
Witness 120’s accounts were “riddled with inconsistencies with each other, 
the physical and forensic evidence, and credible witness accounts” and 
“driven by apparent bias for his friend.”36
Witness 148’s account was “inconsistent with the physical and forensic 
evidence [and] undisputed facts” and “inherently unreliable”; she 
“admittedly did not see portions of the incident based on her vantage 
point” and “did not report what she witnessed for nearly seven months 
without any reasonable explanation for the delay, giving her ample 
opportunity to research the facts in the form of media stories and county 
grand jury transcripts” and “told federal prosecutors at the outset of her 
interview that she ‘didn’t trust police at all.’ ”37
How could so many people give incorrect accounts, and how could those 
accounts be so readily believed by those engaging in violent protests? I am not 
competent to survey the psychological pathways by which unconscious bias 
may have distorted perceptions or memory, or by which conscious hostility 
may have motivated fabrication. Even in the absence of a sophisticated 
psychological account, however, it is worth considering whether one ingredient 
in such widespread acceptance of misinformation by the public was Ferguson 
citizens’ reasonable mistrust of their police force. Witness 148 was surely not the 
only one with police-trust issues, but only the most candid. Investigators also 
found many other “purported witnesses [who] upon being interviewed by law 
enforcement, acknowledged that they did not actually witness the shooting, 
but rather repeated what others told them in the immediate aftermath of the 
shooting.”38 Rumors about the shooting obviously spread very quickly; the 
hands-up-don’t-shoot meme interpreting the event quickly took hold. But it 
could take hold only in a soil of mistrust created by the policies described in 
the Ferguson Report.
The reverse-broken-windows theory suggests that in the most important 
contexts of police credibility, such as the Brown shooting, offi  cers and the 
entire criminal justice system depend on a reservoir of credibility so that the 
citizenry will remain calm and not believe the worst about its public servants. 
The Ferguson police department, however, wasted that credibility in its stop-
and-frisk practices, policies on manner of arrest, and the like.
Besides offi  cer credibility in the eyes of the public, offi  cers’ own self-control 
and law-abiding attitudes can be worn down in small-stakes contexts. The 
normal broken-windows thesis has force when applied to offi  cers as well: 
Offi  cers who feel they can get away with unnecessarily harsh conduct or 
unjustifi ably racially disparate patterns are more likely to feel they can get 
away with violating more serious norms. Walter Scott’s possible murder by a 
North Charleston police offi  cer may be an example.
36. Id. at 75.
37. Id. at 77.
38. Id. at 77.
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Because police credibility is essential to the performance of their jobs, it is 
a grave mistake to analyze instances of police misconduct in one-dimensional 
zero-sum terms, as if the only issues are how aggressive we want police to be, 
or how much we value victims of crime versus criminal suspects. It is not. A 
zero-sum background assumption will make us read the Ferguson Report as 
simply an anti-police document that seeks only to make police less aggressive—
to make them more concerned with the rights of those they investigate, relative 
to their concern with the rights of crime victims—and read the Brown Report 
as merely a balancing pro-police document. But such a zero-sum picture is 
grossly misleading. Zero-sum thinking will make us miss the opportunity to 
see how the pattern of police behavior explained in one report might help 
explain the false reports documented in such detail in the other.
An unfortunate instance of such a one-dimensional approach to the issues 
of Ferguson appears in Heather Mac Donald’s commentary in The Wall Street 
Journal on the “Ferguson eff ect.”39 Mac Donald sees reports like the Ferguson 
Report as part of an “incessant drumbeat against the police” and associates 
“hostility to the police” with a deadly decrease in “offi  cer morale.”40 A follow-
up piece41 blamed “antipolice agitation dedicated to the proposition that bias 
infects policing in predominantly black communities,” leading police to be 
“increasingly reluctant to investigate suspicious behavior.”42
Mac Donald is right about one thing: It is indeed very important for our 
police to be energetic about investigating genuinely suspicious behavior. 
We should not be “antipolice.” Like Stuntz—and many others, including 
our editor Robin West43—I have written in favor of a constitutional right to 
police protection under the Equal Protection Clause; I favor it normatively 
as well.44 Crime victims have a constitutional and moral right to be protected, 
and protected equally, by the police. To the extent she sees the importance 
of concern for crime victims, Mac Donald gets this right. But realizing the 
extreme importance of policing does not mean shielding police from any and all 
critical scrutiny. Stuntz’s work, similarly insisting on the literal meaning of the 
equal “protection of the laws” (i.e., protection from violence, and the right to 
39. Heather Mac Donald, Opinion, The New Nationwide Crime Wave: The Consequences of the ‘Ferguson 
Eff ect’ Are Already Appearing: The Main Victims of Growing Violence Will Be the Inner-City Poor, WALL ST. 
J. (May 29, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-nationwide-crime-wave-1432938425.
40. Id.
41. Heather Mac Donald, Opinion, Explaining Away the New Crime Wave: Activists Continue to Deny the 
Importance of Proactive Community Policing, Even as Shootings Increase, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/explaining-away-the-new-crime-wave-1434319888.
42. Id.
43. ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (1994).
44. See Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 
GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1 (2008) [hereinafter EP1]; Christopher R. Green, The Original 
Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. 
RTS. L.J. 219 (2009). For a long list of others, see EP1, supra, at 5-9 & nn.19-39.
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a remedy45) even as he subjects the criminal justice system to thoroughgoing 
criticism, likewise shows how a concern for the value of policing and criticism 
of those who supply it go together. 
It is important, then, to attend to the nuance that Mac Donald ignores. 
Properly understood, the Ferguson Report is a call for better policing, not 
simply less. It is also, however, critical to see the pitfall she anticipates. In 
practice, the easiest way to deal with the criticisms, particularly in places like 
Ferguson where budgetary considerations loom so large, is simply to require 
the police to be less aggressive, or less numerous, or both. Both those who 
demand changes in police policies and those who respond to such demands 
should beware of this pitfall.
3. Criminal Procedure: The Need for More Manner-of-Arrest Law
Pages 28 to 41 of the Ferguson Report go into great detail on an issue Stuntz 
stressed many times: the method of conducting stops and arrests, as well as the 
decision to conduct one itself. Stuntz complained repeatedly that the law had 
so much more to say about the stop/arrest decision itself, but so little to say 
about the method:
For every reported decision discussing the law of deadly force, dozens discuss 
the rules that govern automobile searches. And amazingly, there is virtually 
no case law governing the use of non-deadly force. No one knows what the 
Fourth Amendment requires before an offi  cer strikes a suspect because courts 
do not discuss the issue—they are too busy discussing the terms under which 
offi  cers can open paper bags found in cars.46
The lack of signifi cant method-of-arrest law is striking in light of the 
relative importance of fairness in police methods for maintaining, or eroding, 
perceived police legitimacy and hence law-abidingness. Following Tyler and 
Huo’s work, Stuntz notes that the manner of police in individual encounters 
can be more important than their raw numbers, because individuals can see it 
easily, while they may not know how frequently the police interact with other 
citizens:
[I]t is the manner of the stop—the degree of disrespect and force the offi  cers 
display—that largely determines how the suspect will react: with mild 
embarrassment, or with rage. . . . [I]ndividuals’ responses to law enforcers 
depend not on the outcomes of their encounters but on whether the 
individuals thought they were treated fairly—with “fairness” captured by a 
trio of factors Tyler labels neutrality, benevolence, and status recognition. . 
. . [T]his process-based response explains why blacks and Latinos are more 
45. STUNTZ, CACJ, supra note 4, at 99-128.
46. William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1043-44 (1995). See also, e.g., William 
J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 446 (1995) (“[T]he 
case law on the use of non-deadly force is close to nonexistent.” (emphasis omitted) (citing 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989))). Sure enough, the Ferguson Report cites only 
Graham from the Supreme Court. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 28.
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dissatisfi ed than whites with their treatment by the police; it also explains why 
the fi rst two groups are likely to be less compliant in encounters with police 
than the third. Importantly, both dissatisfaction and noncompliance persist 
despite nearly identical perceptions about outcomes in police encounters 
among the three groups. . . . If street stops were carried out more politely, 
if suspects were treated with more dignity, the level of suspect compliance 
with the police would rise. That would presumably mean more consensual 
searches—a boon for the police. It might also mean a rise in police safety: Tyler 
notes a sizeable body of social science research that suggests that the risk of 
violence rises with the level of police aggression. If Tyler’s claims are even 
partly true, the police could simultaneously increase the number of Terry stops, 
decrease the injury those stops cause, and substantially reduce complaints of 
police discrimination—all without changing the way they select search targets. 
If that is true, the law clearly has its grip on the wrong lever. Worrying about 
how street stops happen makes more sense than worrying about how many of 
them happen.47
The Ferguson Report’s extensive details about discrimination in methods of 
arrest, combined with the evident lack of credibility and perceived legitimacy 
of Ferguson’s police among its citizenry, supply more distressing data points 
in favor of the Tyler-Huo-Stuntz diagnosis of citizens’ interactions with police.
4. State Constitutional and Administrative Law: 
The Scarcity of Information, Lack of Judicial Scrutiny,
and the Range of Possible Responses
The Brown Report was one of the most thorough reviews of a grand jury’s 
non-indictment decisions ever. Decisions not to enforce the law—whether 
made by police, or by prosecutors, or by grand juries—are the lowest-visibility 
decisions in the criminal justice system. But they are among the most important. 
Despite all the damning information the Ferguson Report did uncover, even 
that report was hampered at many key points by the lack of information 
about non-enforcement.48 We cannot know the full extent of racial disparity 
in the criminal justice system without knowing how much crime, or apparent 
crime, the police do not investigate. And such information is, by its nature, not 
collected.
One way to encourage systematic reform would be more judicial scrutiny of 
administrative regularity at the instigation of individual litigants. Precedents 
denying standing for crime victims to challenge the non-enforcement of the 
47. William J. Stuntz, Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2173-74 (2002) (citing Tyler, Trust 
and Law Abidingness, supra note 7, and TYLER & HUO, supra note 7). See also STUNTZ, CACJ, supra 
note 4, at 292 (“On city streets, ‘shock and awe’ generates shock and anger, plus sympathy 
for the young men the police are targeting.”).
48. See, e.g., FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 39-40 (noting lack of use-of-force reports and 
investigations); id. at 45 (lack of transparency in court procedures); id. at 59 (unclear bond 
procedures); id. at 64 (incomplete information on traffi  c stops); id. at 67 (lack of information 
on reasons for arrest).
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criminal law,49 providing no remedy for victim-side disparity in the death 
penalty, 50 allowing no scrutiny for non-prosecution decisions,51 typically 
giving no remedy52 or discovery53 for selective prosecutions, and fi nding no 
Fourth Amendment problem with pretextual stops54 could be re-examined 
on such grounds. Stuntz off ers one reform proposal: a general requirement 
that prosecutors show that their charging decisions and sentences (and the 
underlying policing that underlies those prosecutions) fi t a general pattern of 
enforcement against similarly situated defendants:
Courts should entertain claims that criminal sentences for defendants 
belonging to diff erent racial and ethnic groups diff er, even when the crimes 
charged are similar. . . . For all sentences of incarceration above some minimal 
level—say three or six months—prosecutors should be required to show that 
sentences at least as severe have been imposed some minimum number 
of times for the same crime in the same state on similar facts. . . . When a 
given sentence for a given crime is . . . imposed less than systematically, its 
imposition should be deemed a violation of equal protection: diff erent laws 
are being applied to similarly situated off enders.55
Greater equal-protection remedies for individuals, however, can go only 
so far under current doctrine. Even if, as the Ferguson Report plausibly 
concludes, racial stop-and-frisk disparity combined with the opposite disparity 
in actual discovery of contraband is “unexplainable on grounds other than 
race and evidence that racial bias, whether implicit or explicit, has shaped law 
enforcement conduct,”56 that is not enough to show an individual constitutional 
violation. Even if there is evidence that the Ferguson Department as a whole has 
behaved unconstitutionally over the range of its activities, without more we 
cannot infer the presence of unconstitutional racial motivation in a particular 
case. 
One answer would be to give individuals greater standing to assert the rights 
of similarly situated fellow subjects of the criminal justice system, modifying 
rules like McClesky v. Kemp57 and Los Angeles v. Lyons.58 But even if these changes 
could be justifi ed and implemented, signifi cant improvement in the criminal 
49. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
50. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
51. Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973).
52. United States v. Wayte, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
53. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
54. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
55. STUNTZ, CACJ, supra note 4, at 297-98. 
56. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 71. 
57. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
58. 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (fi nding no standing to pursue anti-chokehold injunction without personal 
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justice system requires policymakers who themselves see the need for improved 
transparency and greater structural safeguards of fairness. Attorney General 
Holder said in releasing the report that he hoped it would spur the Ferguson 
Police Department itself to adopt policies and safeguards, and his department 
has sought similar reforms in other cities. 
State constitutions and administrative law are essential tools as well. Stuntz’s 
proposal for prosecutorial regularity among similarly situated defendants need 
not be imposed by the federal government or by courts—it could be adopted 
by an individual prosecutor’s offi  ce, or by a state legislature, or by an attorney 
general acting to protect the legitimacy of those who act in the name of the 
state. 
Ferguson illustrates the crying need for more administrative regularity in 
the criminal justice system. If nothing else, an Overton Park-style requirement of 
reasoned decision-making by police and prosecutors can be imposed by state 
decision-makers.59 State attorneys general generally possess great supervisory 
power under state constitutions over state criminal justice systems.60 They 
should utilize it. Information is, of course, not cost-free, but maintaining 
a legitimate criminal justice system cannot be done cost-eff ectively in the 
dark. It should not take crises like Ferguson or other distressingly common 
instances of police misbehavior to make voters, taxpayers, and representatives 
see the need for information about how the criminal justice system distributes 
its investigative and protective resources. 
5. Conclusion
I have no simple solution to the budgetary concerns that drove Ferguson’s 
misplaced priorities in the fi rst place. The municipal history of the St. Louis area 
is complicated.61 Greater attention to these issues among law students will not, 
moreover, magically produce money to fund the sorts of internal investigations 
that greater administrative regularity would require. Money taken out of scarce 
59. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (requiring “adequate 
explanation” of agency action under arbitrary-and-capricious-or-abuse-of-discretion APA 
review).
60. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13 (stating that the Attorney General is the “chief law offi  cer 
of the State” with a duty “to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately 
enforced,” who shall “direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff ,” and has the 
power to “require any of said offi  cers to make reports concerning the investigation, detection, 
prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions,” and to prosecute if 
“any law of the State is not being adequately enforced in any county”); 7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorney 
General § 6 (2015) (“[A]n attorney general may not only control and manage all litigation in 
behalf of the state, but he may also intervene in all suits or proceedings which are of concern 
to the general public.”); Note, The Common Law Power of State Attorneys General to Supersede Local 
Prosecutors, 60 YALE L.J. 559, 560 (1951) (noting demand for more “uniform enforcement of 
state laws” through greater attorney general control).
Rachel Barkow is one of the fwe scholars to address the division of authority between 
district attorneys and attorneys general. See Rachel Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What 
the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519 (2011).
61. See, e.g., JEFF SMITH, FERGUSON IN BLACK AND WHITE (2014).
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police or municipal budgets to fund more self-consciously equitable policing 
might be seen as a threat to the provision of adequate protective services. If 
Tyler, Huo, and Stuntz’s interpretation of the sociological preconditions for 
law-abiding behavior is right, however—and the juxtaposition of the Brown 
and Ferguson reports suggests that it is—we must see racial equity not as the 
competitor of the adequate provision of police services, but its prerequisite. 
Put another way, acknowledging the reverse-broken-windows explanation of 
the importance of small-level police misbehavior can reinforce, rather than 
undermine, the traditional broken-windows thesis about the importance of 
small-level disorder among the citizenry. Cleaning up municipal police forces 
and cleaning up our cities should not be put at odds with each other. Protecting 
citizens and respecting them should go hand in hand.
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